

# Mechanism Design with Transfers

Social Choice Function  $F: \Theta \rightarrow X$

$X$ : space of all outcomes

In this domain, an outcome  $x$  has two components  
allocation  $a$  and payment vector  $\pi = (\pi_1, \dots, \pi_n)$ ,  $\pi_i \in \mathbb{R}$

Examples of allocations

① A public decision of building a bridge, park, or museum.

$$a \in A = \{\text{park, bridge, } \dots\}$$

② Allocation of a divisible good, e.g., a shared spectrum

$$a = (a_1, a_2, \dots, a_n), \quad a_i \in [0, 1], \quad \sum_{i \in N} a_i = 1$$

$a_i$ : fraction of the resource  $i$  gets.

③ Single indivisible object allocation

$$a = (a_1, \dots, a_n), \quad a_i \in \{0, 1\}, \quad \sum_{i \in N} a_i \leq 1$$

④ Partition of indivisible objects.

$S$  = set of objects

$$A = \{(A_1, \dots, A_n) : A_i \subseteq S \quad \forall i \in N, \quad A_i \cap A_j = \emptyset \quad \forall i \neq j\}$$

Type of an agent  $i$  is  $\theta_i \in \Theta_i$ , this is a private information of  $i$ .

Agents' benefit from an allocation is defined via the valuation function

Valuation depends on the allocation and type of the player

$$v_i : A \times \Theta_i \rightarrow \mathbb{R} \quad [\text{independent private values}]$$

E.g., if  $i$  has a type "environment saver"  $\theta_i^{env}$   
 and  $a \in \{ \text{Bridge}, \text{Park} \}$ ,  $v_i(B, \theta_i^{env}) < v_i(P, \theta_i^{env})$   
 the value can change if the type changes to "business friendly"  $\theta_i^{bus}$   
 $v_i(B, \theta_i^{bus}) > v_i(P, \theta_i^{bus})$

Payments  $\pi_i \in \mathbb{R}$ ,  $\forall i \in N$

Payment vector  $\underline{\pi} = (\pi_1, \pi_2, \dots, \pi_n)$

Utility of player  $i$ , when its type is  $\theta_i$  and the outcome is  $(a, \underline{\pi})$  is given by  $u_i((a, \underline{\pi}), \theta_i) = v_i(a, \theta_i) - \pi_i$   
 possibly non-linear      linear in payment

Quasi-linear payoffs

Q: Why is this a domain restriction?

Consider two alternatives  $(a, \pi)$  and  $(a, \pi')$

Suppose  $\pi'_i < \pi_i$ , there cannot be any preference profile in the quasi-linear domain where  $(a, \pi)$  is more preferred than  $(a, \pi')$  for agent  $i$ .

The utilities are  $v_i(a, \theta_i) - \pi'_i > v_i(a, \theta_i) - \pi_i$

In the complete domain both orders would have been feasible.

This simple restriction opens up the opportunity for a lot of SCFs to satisfy interesting properties